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1. Introduction
Business cycles have ambiguous effects on the rate of new firm formation. On the
one hand economic downturns discourage opportunity entrepreneurship, by reducing the profitability of good ideas. On the other hand, downturns induce increases
in the rate of necessity entrepreneurship, where individuals create businesses primarily because of involuntary job loss and the scarcity of vacancies. [Blau(1987)
Evans and Leighton (1990), Blanchflower and Meyer (1994)]. The net effect of
these two countervailing forces is that rates of new business creation may rise or
fall during recessions. Indeed, the recent recession has had opposite effects on the
rate of new business creation in Canada and the United States: between October 2008 and October 2009, self-employment declined by over four percent in the
United States (Shane 2010) while in Canada it increased by the same amount
[LaRochelle-Côté (2010)]. Recent macroeconometric evidence [Thurik et al.
(2008)] suggests that on average increases in unemployment stimulate selfemployment among OECD countries, but country-specific effects seem to be
strong.
Whether the net effect of recessions is to increase or decrease new business formation, increases in the fraction of new businesses that are founded by necessity
entrepreneurs are likely to have marked effects on the quality of new businesses.
Necessity entrepreneurs typically have less human and financial capital [Caliendo,
and Kritikos (2009)], and they are less likely to have business ideas with significant growth prospects [Shane (2009)]. As a result, they also invest less in their
business [Evans and Jovanovic (1989), Santarelli and Vivarelli, (2007)], and they
are less likely to incorporate [Bruhn (2008)].
Reduced business quality, lower investment, and lower human capital together
imply lower earnings and lower earnings growth rates for necessity entrepreneurs
[e.g., Bates (1990), Preisendörfer and Voss (1990)]. These factors also imply lower
survival rates for necessity entrepreneurs [e.g., Block and Wagner (2010), Caliendo and Kritikos (2009)], and there is some tentative evidence that these lower
survival rates may be entirely explained by differences in human capital [Block
and Sandner (2009)]. However, because of their lower human capital, necessity
entrepreneurs also have lower opportunity costs after any recession is over. Thus,
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despite evidence indicating lower average survival rates, some necessity entrepreneurs are likely to persist in business for quite some time while earning relatively
little [Gimeno at al. (1997), Hamilton (2000)].
Figure 1 illustrates some of these forces at work in Ireland during the recent recession. After a long period of decline, from 2002 to 2008, the rate of nascent
entrepreneurial activity recorded by the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor rose
significantly between 2008 and 2010. At the same time, there was a dramatic
increase in the fraction of entrepreneurs reporting that they were creating businesses out of necessity rather than because good opportunities had presented
themselves. Between 2002 and 2008, necessity entrepreneurship had never accounted for more than fifteen percent of nascent entrepreneurs; in 2010 they accounted for over thirty percent. Note also the marked decline between 2008 and
2010 in the discontinuation rate – the rate at which nascent entrepreneurs give
up business activities and (in most cases) return to wage employment.
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Figure 1. Entrepreneurial activity in Ireland, 2002-2010. Source; Kelley et al. (2011, p. 51)

This paper constructs and numerically evaluates a model that builds on two
premises. First, that necessity entrepreneurs account for a larger fraction of businesses among cohorts of firms created during recessions. Second, necessity entre-
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preneurs operate firms with relatively poor performance, but many of them continue in operation for extended periods of time. We conjecture that these two
premises together imply that transitory economic downturns induce long-lasting
effects through the quality of the business they spawn.
To examine this conjecture, we construct a simple dynamic model of occupational
choice in the presence of involuntary job loss and uncertain job finding, in which
agents vary in their innate ability. The model yields three distinct sets of agents:
a group of high-ability opportunity entrepreneurs who create businesses regardless of the state of the economy; a group of moderate-ability agents who only
create businesses as necessity entrepreneurs after involuntary job loss; and a
group of low-ability agents who never create businesses. Business earnings are
stochastically increasing in ability, so necessity entrepreneurs on average earn less
than opportunity entrepreneurs. However, the profit level that triggers exit is
endogenously increasing in ability, so necessity entrepreneurs will continue to
operate businesses that opportunity entrepreneurs would abandon.
We then calibrate the model using estimates from the literature on relative performance and survival, and examine the evolution of the distribution of profits
among cohorts of firms that were created during recessions and during normal
times. Our model suggests that a short-lived recession can induce an economically
meaningful decline in the earnings of a cohort, and this decline persists for many
years after the economy has returned to full-employment. For example, median
earnings of new businesses are, immediately upon entry, about one percent lower
for a cohort entering in a recession year than for a baseline cohort. This difference grows over time, despite the more rapid exit rate of low-ability entrepreneurs. After four years, median earnings differ by about 2.2 percent, and after ten
years by about 2.4 percent.

2. Ability and Entry into Self-Employment
Ability is indexed by a. Employees earn a wage, w(a), which is increasing in
ability. At the end of the period they retain their job with probability m(a),
where m ¢(a) ³ 0 , and with probability 1 - m(a) they are laid off. Agents may
eschew wage work in favor of establishing a business. Doing so costs nothing, but
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it takes one period to establish the business, which does not begin to yield a flow
of income until the next period. An unemployed agent has two choices. First, he
may actively search for a job, which yields employment in the subsequent period
with probability l(a), where l ¢(a) ³ 0. Unemployment benefits, b(a), b ¢(a) ³ 0,
are payable only to agents who were involuntarily laid off and are actively looking for work, and they are payable only for the first period of unemployment.
Second, the agent may establish a business. It is not possible to establish a business and look for wage work, so no unemployment benefits are payable in this
case.
2.1 Occupational Choices
Let VE (a) and VS (a) denote the values of being employed and having established a business. We will define the expected payoff to self-employment later,
and for the moment we will simply note that it is strictly increasing in a. Let
VU1 (a) denote the value of being unemployed in the first period after being laid
off, and let VU2 (a) denote the value in the second and subsequent periods of unemployment.
The Bellman equation for a wage worker is

{

}

(1)

}

(2)

VE (a) = max w(a) + bm(a)VE (a) + b(1 - m(a))VU1(a), bVS (a) .
The first-period of involuntary unemployment yields value

{

VU1(a) = max b(a) + bl(a)VE (a) + b(1 - l(a))VU2 (a), bVS (a) ,
while the second and subsequent periods yield

{

}

VU2 (a) = max bl(a)VE (a) + b(1 - l(a))VU2 (a), bVS (a) .

(3)

We make the following assumptions:
A.1 w(a) > b(a) "a,
A.2 m(a) ³ l(a) "a,
A.3 Let AE denote the set of employed agents that do not immediately
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enter self-employment. Then VS¢(a) > VE¢ (a) "a Î AE .
Assumption A.1 says that wages exceed unemployment benefits for all abilities.
A.2 states that keeping a job is more likely than finding a job for all abilities.
These two assumptions are not contentious: in the United States, national average unemployment benefits are 36 percent of previous earnings [Fletcher and
Hedgpeth (2010)], while job retention rates are much greater than job finding
rates in all OECD countries [Hobijn and Sahin (2007, Table 4)].
The third assumption states that expected self-employment earnings are more
sensitive to ability than are wages. As is well known [cf. Jovanovic (1994)], if no
restrictions are imposed on the returns to ability in self-employment relative to
wage work, essentially arbitrary relationships between ability and occupational
choice are possible. Assumption A.3 is consistent with Rosen's (1981) theory of
superstars, in which the most able must enter self-employment in order to capture the full returns to their ability. It is also consistent with empirical evidence.
For example, in samples that are reasonably representative of the population as a
whole [e.g., Hamilton's (2000) analysis of the SIPP sample] the self-employed
earn less than their observationally-equivalent counterparts in wage work, while
in samples that focus on higher ability workers [e.g., Gort and Lee (2007) and
Ohyama (2007), both using the SESTAT sample] self-employment earnings exceeds wages among the most able and are lower than wages among the less able
in the sample.
Assumptions A.1 through A.3 are sufficient to establish the following result:
LEMMA 1. (a), VE (a), VU1(a), and VU2 (a) are increasing in a. (b) VE (a) ³ VU1 (a)
³ VU2 (a), with strict inequalities for a sufficiently small.
We establish these results by graphical means. Figure 2 illustrates the choices
that are made by agents as their ability varies. By assumption A.3, the present
value of establishing a business intersects the value of continuing in wage employment once from below, indicated by a3. Self-employment is preferred to wage
employment only for agents with ability greater than a3. Below this threshold,
VE (a) > VU1 (a) , so the agent in his first period of unemployment who is indifferent between job search and business creation has ability level a2 < a3 . Similar-
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Figure 2. Occupational choices by ability.

ly, VU1 (a) > VU2 (a) for all a < a2 , yielding a third critical value, a1 < a2 ; agents
in their second period of unemployment with ability level greater than a1 abandon job search and establish a business. We summarize these observations in the
following proposition:
PROPOSITION 1. There exist a1 < a2 < a3 such that (a) if a > a3 , the agent always chooses self-employment; (b) if a < a1 , the agent never chooses selfemployment; (c) if a2 < a < a3 , the agent chooses self-employment in the
first period of unemployment, and (d) if a1 < a < a2 , the agent chooses selfemployment in the second period of unemployment.
For ease of reference, we shall refer to agents that form a business regardless of
their employment status as opportunity entrepreneurs. Agents that create a
business immediately after involuntary job loss will be referred to as necessity I
entrepreneurs, while those that enter only after losing unemployment benefits will
be referred to as necessity II entrepreneurs.
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2.2 Self-Employment Earnings and Exit
Self-employment earnings are not known in advance of establishing the business.
Agents contemplating business entry know only that per-period profits are given
by
pt (q ) = gq + et ,

(4)

where q is fixed business quality and e is an idiosyncratic shock to earnings. The
value of the shock in the first period after business creation is normalized to zero.
Quality is a random draw from the conditional distribution F (q | a) , which is
strictly decreasing in a. That is, business quality is stochastically increasing in
agent ability. The idiosyncratic shocks exhibit persistence: they are draws from
G(e ' | e) , which is strictly decreasing in e.
Job search is not possible while creating or managing a business, and unemployment benefits are not payable to agents who close down their business.1 We shall
also assume that an agent who closes down his business cannot create another
business without first receiving an offer of wage employment. Thus, we can write
the opportunity cost of continuation as
VU3 (a) = bl(a)VE (a) + b(1 - l(a))VU3 (a)
=

bl(a)
VE (a) º VU2 (a) .
1 - b(1 - l(a))

(5)

As in Hopenhayn (1992), there exists a profit threshold, p* (a), such that agents
close their business the first period that profits fall below the threshold. The opportunity cost of business ownership is increasing in a, so the exit threshold is
higher for more able agents. The Bellman equation for a business owner with
ability a and currently earning profits p is given by

1

Former business owners do not generally qualify for unemployment benefits unless
they paid unemployment insurance. For sole proprietorships, partnerships, and owners of limited liability companies, payment into unemployment insurance requires
electing to have one's business treated as a corporation for tax purposes. Few small
business owners choose to do so in practice.
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{

}

VS (a, p) = max p + b ò Vs (a, p ')dH (p ' | p), VU3 (a)

(6)

where H is strictly decreasing in p. The effect of agent ability on the expected
duration of a business is in general ambiguous. On the one hand, higher-ability
agents will be more likely to abandon a business of any given quality because
their opportunity cost of continuation is greater. On the other hand, higherability agents are more likely to establish a high-quality business, which induces
longer survival times. Which of these effects dominate depends on the sensitivity
to ability of expected business quality, and the effect of business quality on the
likelihood that profits fall below the appropriate threshold for an agent. It is easy
to conjure up examples in which expected business survival is increasing in ability, decreasing in ability, or in which the relationship is non-monotonic.
As p = gq in the first period of entry, the expected value of creating a business
is given by

(

bVS (a) = F p * (a) | a

2

) 1 - bb(1l-(al)(a))V

E

+ b2

(a) + bg

ò

qdF (q | a)

q ³p* (a )

ò ò V (a, p ')dH (p ' | q ) dF (q | a) .
s

(7)

*

q ³p (a )

Equations (1)-(3) and (7) define the optimal choices in the model, which are as
described in Proposition 1 as long as assumption A.3 holds. From (7), it is easy
to verify that VS (a) is strictly increasing in g, so that a sufficient condition for
Assumption A.3 to hold is that g be sufficiently large.

3. Dynamics of the Firm Size Distribution
In this section, we analyze a simple model of firm growth and survival. The model, which is presented in subsection 3.1, is a standard neoclassical growth model
[cf. Hopenhayn (1992)], in which initial earnings depend on business quality,
earnings growth is exogenous and stochastic, and the exit threshold depends on
agent ability. Subsection 3.2 reviews empirical evidence on the growth and survival of young businesses, and uses this evidence to calibrate parameters of the
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model. The calibrated model is then used in subsection 3.3 to measure the persistence of low-quality cohorts born during recessions.
3.1 Firm growth and survival

Suppose that

et = q(q )t + et -1 + sut ,

(8)

Where q ¢(q ) ³ 0 gives potentially better growth prospects to higher-quality businesses, and ut is a standard normal random variable. To explore the survival
time of a firm with quality q founded by an agent with ability a, we need the
distribution of the Markov time, T, that satisfies

{

}

T = inf t : pt (q ) £ p * (a) ,

(9)

where pt (q ) - q(q )t = q + et is a random variable with normally-distributed increments in each period. This is a first-passage problem which, following convention, we will analyze in continuous time. Define
wt =

q + q(q )t - pt
,
s

(10)

which is normal with zero mean and variance t, while the increments to wt are
independent standard Normals. The continuous time stochastic process that gives
rise to the same distribution as wt at t=0,1,2, . . . , is a standard zero-drift Wiener process, w(t ), with boundary condition w(0)=0. The absorbing barrier for pt
is p * (a) Hence, the corresponding barrier for w(t ) is obtained by replacing pt in
(10) with p* (a). The transformed first passage problem is therefore given by the
distribution of the Markov time, T, that satisfies

ïìï
q(q )t q - p*(a)ïüï
+
T = inf ít : w(t ) ³
ý.
ïï
ïï
s
s
î
þ

(11)

Equation (11) defines the first-passage time of a Wiener process to a linear barrier that is moving away from the origin if q(q ) > 0, and toward the origin if
q(q ) < 0 (Figure 3 plots the former case). Exit is immediate if q £ p * (a) . For
q > p * (a), the distribution of T is given by the well-known Bachelier-Lévy for-
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mula [e.g., Cox and Miller (1965:221)]
*
æ q - p * + qt ö÷
æ
ö
*
2
÷÷ + e -2q(q -p )/s F çç- q - p - qt ÷÷÷,
P (T | a, q ) = F ççççç
èç
è
s 2T ÷ø
s 2T ÷ø

(12)

where F() is the distribution function of a standard normal random variable,
and where for clarity the dependence of q on q and of p* on a have been suppressed.
Taking the limit of (12) yields

ìï1,
if q(q ) £ 0
ï
P (a, q ) = lim P (T | a, q ) = í -2q(q -p* )/s2
.
T ¥
ïïe
< 1, if q(q ) > 0
ïî
¥

(13)

If there is no positive drift to profits, all firms eventually die. In contrast, with
positive drift, some firm will survive indefinitely. The unconditional distribution
of firm exit times is then obtained by taking expectations over q and over the
ability distribution of firm owners.

q   * (q)   t



0

 (t )

T

Figure 3. The first passage problem.

t
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The evolution of the distribution of the size of surviving firms is straightforward
to characterize. Let w(t ) denote the value at time t of the Wiener process (10).
For any w < (qt + q - p * ) / s, the probability that w(t ) = w without having previously crossed the boundary is given by the complement to the crossing probability of a Brownian bridge that begins at w(0) = 0, terminates at w(t ) = w, and
has an absorbing boundary (qt + q - p * ) / s. This is a well-known distribution
[e.g., Scheike (1992), Proposition 3], given by
ü
ïì
ï
qt + q - p *
yt (w; a, q ) º Pr ïíw(t ) <
"t Î [0, t ] | w(t ) = w ï
ý
ïï
ï
s
ï
î
þ
ìï
*
*
ì
ü
ïï1 - exp ïï- 2 æçq - p öæ
÷÷ çç qt + q - p - w ÷÷öïï ,
ç
í
÷ç
÷÷ý
ï
ç
ï
s
øï
ï t çè s ÷øèç
ï
= íï
î
þ
ïï
ï
0,
ï
ï
î

qt + q - p *
s
.
qt + q - p *
w³
s
w<

(14)

As the unconditional distribution of w(t ) is normal with mean zero and variance
t, the density of w at time t among surviving firms is obtained upon weighting
each point in the density of a truncated standard normal random variable by the
relative probability that the process attains that particular value of w at time t
without having previously crossed the absorbing barrier. That is,

gt (w | a, q ) =

yt (w; a, q )ft (w)

ò

*

(q -p (a ))/s

-¥

,

(15)

yt (w; a, q )ft (w)d w

where ft (w) is the normal density with mean zero and variance t. Then, by the
method of transformations, the density of profits among surviving firms is
gt (p | a, q ) =

yt ((ft + q - p) / s; a, q ) ft ((qt + q - p) / s)
sò

(q -p* )/s

-¥

yt (w; a, q ) ft (w)d w

(16)

Taking expectations of (16) over q and a yields the predicted observable distribution of size among all surviving firms. Before doing so, however, it is useful to
delineate some basic properties of the conditional distribution (16).
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PROPERTIES OF THE CONDITIONAL SIZE DISTRIBUTION. (a) For any t > 0,
gt [p | q, a)] is positively skewed, with both mean and skewness rising over
time. (b) For any a ¢ > a, E [pt | q, a ¢)] - E [pt | q, a)] is increasing over time.
These properties are each the direct result of the slower growth and selective exit
of underperforming firms. Figure 4 illustrates for the case q = 0.25. At t = 0, all
firms begin with profits of q. Subsequently, expected profits rise, as does their
variance. Selection eliminates firms from the lower tail of the distribution, raising
its mean and inducing skewness. Because the exit threshold, p * (a), is increasing
in a, these selection effects are stronger among more able operators of firms with
given business quality q. As a result the profit distributions for the a-type and
a ¢ -type entrepreneurs diverge over time.

gt(p;q,a)

gt(p;q,a/ )
a/ > a

0

0

p*(a)
p*(a/ )

q
5

10 5

Figure 4. Conditional size distribution of surviving firms with constant
business quality. q = 2, p * (a) = 1, p * (a ¢) = 1.5, s = 1, q = 0.25.
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Figure 4 holds business quality constant, and the evolving differences in the two
distributions they each depict are driven entirely by the stronger selection effects
on high-ability owners. Put another way, low-ability owners of businesses with a
given business quality survive longer on average than high-ability owners of similar businesses. Empirical evidence, however, shows that survival is increasing in
ability. In our calibrated model, we achieve consistency with empirical evidence
because business quality is increasing in ability, sufficiently so as to offset the

gt(p;q,a)

gt(p;q,a/)
a/ > a

0

0

p*(a)

q

p*(a/)

5

10 5

Figure 5. Conditional size distribution of surviving firms with varying
business qualities. q(a) = 2, q(a ¢) = 2.5, p * (a) = 1, p * (a ¢) = 1.5, s =1,
q(a) = 0, q(a ¢) = 0.25 .
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stronger selection effects coming from the higher exit threshold.2 Figure 5 provides an illustration of the way the profit distributions can evolve when business
quality is (deterministically) greater for the more able entrepreneur. Profits in
this case begin at different initial values, and then the difference in mean growth
rates induce more rapid diverge than in the previous case.
The observable distribution of profits is, of course, an average of the separate
distributions, weighted by the fraction of each business type, defined by the pair
{q, a}, surviving at each point in time. In the case of this second example, the
weight on the distribution for high-quality businesses monotonically increases
over time (see Figure 6). Eventually all low-quality businesses fail, so the distribution of profits among surviving firms converges on the distribution for highquality businesses. However, because some low-ability entrepreneurs do very well,
the rate of convergence may be very slow.
3.2 Parameterization

The effects of a surge in opportunity entrepreneurship on the subsequent size
distribution of young firms depends on a number of features of the model: (i)
differences between the initial earnings of necessity and opportunity entrepreneurs3, (ii) differences between the average growth rates of earnings of necessity
and opportunity entrepreneurs, (iii) the variance of profit growth, and (iv) the
relationship between entrepreneurial type and the exit threshold. To determine
the effect of recessions, we will also need information on the effect of unemployment on entry into self-employment. We review the existing literature to derive
some plausible parameterizations for these components of the model.
Business Duration. Our baseline for differences in survival between opportunity

2

A plausible alternative modeling choice would be to assume that the drift term is
increasing in ability rather than business quality. In this case, if q ¢(a) is large
enough, high-ability owners of a given business quality will survive longer than lowability owners.
3

Recall that there are two degrees of necessity entrepreneurs: those that begin to
create a business immediately upon becoming unemployed (necessity I), and those
that do so only after losing unemployment benefits (necessity II).

15

Fraction of cohort surviving
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1 - P (T | a ¢, q(a ¢))

1 - P (T | a, q (a))

Time

Figure 6. Survival rates. q(a) = 2, q(a ¢) = 2.5, p * (a) = 1,
p * (a ¢) = 1.5, s = 1, q(a) = 0, q(a ¢) = 0.25 .

and necessity entrepreneurs comes from a recent study by Caliendo and Kritikos
(2009). They study a sample of over 1,850 German males, all of whom entered
self-employment from unemployment in the third quarter of 2003 and received
official assistance during their start-up phase. Two surveys were conducted. The
first, conducted at the time of startup, obtained information about personal characteristics as well as motivations for business creation. This survey enabled Caliendo and Kritikos to distinguish between respondents who only identified positive factors that pulled them into business, those who identified a mixture of pull
and push factors, and those who only identified push factors. The last two groups
were much more likely than the first to have been unemployed for more than six
months, to have earned less in unemployment benefits, to be less educated and
less skilled, and to be an immigrant.
The second survey, conducted about 28 months later, identifies exit times of
failed businesses. Figure 7 shows the Kaplan-Meier plots of business survival estimated by Caliendo and Kritikos. After one year, the survival rates were 92 percent for pull entrepreneurs, 79 percent for push entrepreneurs, and 84 percent for
the intermediate group. After around 28 months, the corresponding survival rates
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Figure 7. Business survival rates of 1,855 German men entering selfemployment, according to self-reported motivational factors. From
Caliendo and Kritikos (2009).

were 77, 58, and 66 percent, respectively. At each point in time, the survival rate
of push entrepreneurs was about 80 percent of the survival rate of pull entrepreneurs; the rate for the push-pull types was about 90 percent of the rate of pull
types.
Although all of the respondents in Caliendo and Kritikos' sample were previously
unemployed, we shall apply their estimated relative survival rates to our opportunity, necessity I and necessity II groups. These numbers are not out of line
with other studies. Block and Sandner (2009), using a sample from the German
Socio-Economic Panel Study (GSEPS) with annual frequency, distinguish between opportunity and necessity entrepreneurs according to whether they had
voluntary or involuntary separations from wage work prior to business creation,
They find that the hazard of business failure among opportunity entrepreneurs is
about 75 percent of the hazard among necessity entrepreneurs.4 Carrasco (1999)

4

We exponentiate the appropriate coefficient in column 1 of their Table 3. They
subsequently conclude that much of this difference between the two groups is attri-
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estimated quarterly exit hazards using data from a large Spanish panel. She finds
an unusually high rate of immediate exit (40 percent within three months) for
those who had entered from unemployment, but after nine months the likelihood
of surviving an additional quarter was 89 percent for opportunity entrepreneurs
and 75 percent for necessity entrepreneurs. Finally, using annual Portuguese data, Baptista and Karaöz (2006) report failure odds ratios between previously employed and previous unemployed entrepreneurs ranging from 60 percent to 90
percent.
Self-Employment Earnings. A number of studies provide estimates of the effect
on earnings of previous unemployment immediately prior to self-employment
entry. Among the best known is the evidence from the NLSY offered by Evans
and Leighton (1989). They report that each week of unemployment during the
year prior to a respondent’s first report of self-employment earnings is associated
with a 0.8 percent decline in average earnings. Suppose that necessity I entrepreneurs enter self-employment after 13 weeks of unemployment (unemployment
benefits typically expire after 26 weeks), and suppose necessity II entrepreneurs
enter after 26 weeks. Then Evans and Leighton's estimate implies that p(q | a) is
on average 10.4 percent lower for necessity I entrepreneurs, and 20.8 percent lower among necessity II entrepreneurs, than it is for opportunity entrepreneurs.
These numbers are in line with estimates from some recent studies. Using a larger
sample from the Korean Labor and Income Panel Study (KLIPS), Åstebro, Chen
and Thompson (2011, Table 9) find that transitioning into self-employment from
unemployment reduces earnings in the first year by between 14.7 percent and
17.5 percent, depending on specification, compared with those who transition
from paid work.5 Similarly, Block and Wagner find in the GSEPS that surviving
necessity entrepreneurs earn on average 15.7 percent less than opportunity entrepreneurs.
Block and Wagner also provide separate estimates of the average growth rates of
butable to differences in education levels and industry choice.
5

Entering self-employment after being economically inactive the previous year has an
even larger effect on earnings, ranging from 28.4 percent to 32.5 percent.
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earnings. They report that earnings of necessity entrepreneurs decline on average
at an annual rate of 2.7 percent, while those of opportunity entrepreneurs increase on average by 0.9 percent per year.
Calibration. We now have enough information to carry out some calibrations.
Table 1 summarizes the target moments. The survival rates are taken from Figure 7, and relative average initial profits are taken from Evans and Leighton's
estimates. The average trend growth rates of earnings are based on Block and
Wagner, allowing for somewhat better trend growth among necessity I entrepreneurs than among necessity II entrepreneurs. Turning to the parameters to be
calibrated, we shall for simplicity assume that initial profits is the same for all
entrepreneurs of a given type; the growth rate of profits also has a common variance across each type. Finally, we assume the exit threshold within each entrepreneur group is constant.

Table 1. Target Moments and Parameters

Survival rates:
t=1
t=2
t = 2.5
Initial profits, q
Average profit growth, q/q
Variance of profit growth
Exit threshold

Opportunity

Necessity I

Necessity II

0.91
0.84
0.74

0.85
0.70
0.65

0.79
0.64
0.57

p0
+1.0%
s2
p1*

0.9p0
-2.0%
s2
p2*

0.8p0
-3.0%
s2
p3*

We have five free parameters, s 2 , p0 , p1* , p2* , and p3* , to match to nine mean
survival rates (we will impose the conditions on initial profits and average profit
growth). In matching survival rates, however, only the differences p0 - pi* matter, so we arbitrarily set p0 = 100. The resulting calibrated values, along with
their implied survival rates, are summarized in Table 2. We are able to match
the empirical survival rates very well. Moreover, the implied exit thresholds satisfy p1* > p2* > p3* , as predicted by the model.
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Table 2. Calibrated Parameters and Implied Survival Rates

Opportunity

Necessity I

Necessity II

q
q
s
pi*

100
+1.0
24.7
56.0

90
-1.8
24.7
51.7

80
-2.4
24.7
45.9

Implied survival rates:
t=1
t=2
t = 2.5

0.93
0.81
0.76

0.87
0.70
0.64

0.81
0.63
0.57

Recessions and Necessity Entrepreneurship. The final preparatory task is to devise a reasonable scenario for the effects of a recession-induced change in the mix
of entrepreneurs in a cohort. We begin with estimates from Evans and Leighton's
(1989) analysis of the Current Population Survey, that found a 4.7 percent rate
of entry into self-employment among unemployed white males, and a rate of 2.4
percent among white male wage workers. We compare the effects of two scenarios. In the first, baseline, scenario, we assume that five percent of wage workers
lose their jobs involuntarily in any given year, with ten percent of these newly
unemployed agents remaining without wage work into the second year. In the
second, recession, scenario, we assume a ten percent rate of involuntary job loss,
with 25 percent of the unemployed failing to find wage work within the first year.
Figures 8 and 9 calculate the implied rates of entry by type of entrepreneur over
a two-year period. In the baseline scenario, the total entry rate over a two-year
period is 4.9 percent, of which 89.8 percent are opportunity entrepreneurs. Of the
reminder, 9.8 percent are necessity I entrepreneurs and a negiligble 0.4 percent
are necessity entrepreneurs. The recession scenario induces only a modest rise, to
5.19 percent, in the total entrepreneurship entry rate. However, there is a marked
rise in the fraction that are necessity I and II entrepreneurs, who now account for
15.4 percent and 2.3 percent of total entrants respectively.
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5 PERCENT UNEMPLOYMENT
10 PERCENT UNEMPLOYED FOR TWO PERIODS
employed or
unemployed

88.46
employed
95 employed

2.4%

2.28 selfemployed

4.7%

0.24 selfemployed

10%

0.5 still
unemployed

4.40 opportunity
entrepreneurs

89.8%

employed or
unemployed

4.26
unemployed
5 unemployed

2.12 selfemployed

2.4%

4.7%

4.7%

0.20 selfemployed

0.48 necessity I
entrepreneurs

0.02 selfemployed

0.02 necessity II
entrepreneurs

0.4%

4.90
entrepreneurs

100%

4.27 opportunity
entrepreneurs

82.3%

0.33 selfemployed

0.80 necessity I
entrepreneurs

15.4%

0.12 selfemployed

0.12 necessity II
entrepreneurs

2.3%

5.19
entrepreneurs

100%

9.8%

employed or
unemployed

Figure 8. Baseline scenario.

10 PERCENT UNEMPLOYMENT
25 PERCENT UNEMPLOYED FOR TWO PERIODS
employed or
unemployed

87.84
employed
90 employed

2.4%

2.16 selfemployed
7.03
unemployed

10 unemployed

2.11 selfemployed

2.4%

4.7%

0.47 selfemployed

25%

2.5 still
unemployed

employed or
unemployed

4.7%

4.7%

employed or
unemployed

Figure 9. Recession scenario.
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These scenarios seem reasonable. Glocker and Steiner (2007) estimate that the
transition rate into self-employment for German men [women] rises by 0.1 percent points [0.06 percentage points] for each one-percent increase in the one-year
lagged unemployment rate. Thurik et al. (2008) estimate a VAR for 23 OECD
countries, and find that a permanent one percent increase in the unemployment
rate raises the self-employment rate by between 0.06 percent and 0.24 percent,
depending upon lag length. Our scenarios yield an increase in the transition rate
of 0.058 percentage points for each percentage point increase in the unemployment rate.
3.3 The Persistence of Low-Quality Cohorts

We study the evolution of the earnings distributions of two cohorts. Each cohort
combines opportunity, necessity I and necessity II entrepreneurs in the proportions indicated in the previous subsection. The baseline cohort consists of 89.8
percent opportunity, 9.8 percent necessity I and 0.4 percent necessity II entrepreneurs. In the recession cohort, the corresponding proportions are 82.3 percent,
15.4 percent, and 2.3 percent. The two cohorts differ only by the proportion of
each entrepreneur type they initially contain: within each type, the process of
firm growth and exit is the same for both cohorts.
Figures 10 through 12 summarize our results. Figure 10 plots the earnings distributions of surviving firms for the two cohorts at three different points in time.
The baseline cohort, as expected, first-order stochastically dominates the recession cohort, but differences are apparently modest at every earnings level. In both
cohorts, the mean and variance are increasing with the passage of time: the positive trend growth of opportunity entrepreneurs and the exit of underperforming
firms together outweigh the negative trend growth of necessity entrepreneurs.
Figure 11 plots earnings over time at different percentiles of the distributions.
For percentiles above the median, earnings rise monotonically over time. In contrast, earnings at low percentiles decline before establishing a positive trend. At
these lower percentiles, negative shocks to the stochastic component of growth
are at first sufficient to dominate the average positive trend growth of the cohort.
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Baseline cohort
Recession cohort

t=1

t=4

50

100
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200

250

Figure 10. Earnings distributions by cohort type and age.

Eventually, however, exit of the worst performers enables the trend growth to
dominate even at the lower percentiles.
Finally, Figure 12 plots the proportional difference between earnings of the two
cohorts at different percentiles and over time. At t = 0, all firms of a given type
earn the same; the difference between the two cohorts is a modest 0.95 percent.
Two features of Figure 12 are particularly noteworthy. First, the largest proportional differences emerge in the tails of the distribution. Second, at every percentile, the proportional difference grows over time. For example, the gap between
median earnings of the two cohorts rises to 2.22 percent by t = 4, and to 2.37
percent by t = 10. Given our calibration, the appropriate interpretation of a unit
of t is a year. Consequently, our calibrated model yields results consistent with
our conjecture that excess entry of necessity entrepreneurs during recessions can
have highly persistent effects on the earnings distribution of young firms.

4. Conclusions
This paper developed a simple model of occupational choice in the presence of
involuntary unemployment. Our model predicts that high-ability agents choose
business creation regardless of their employment status, while low-ability agents
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Figure 11. Evolution of earnings by percentile and year after entry.
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Figure 12. Baseline and recession cohort earnings differentials, by
percentile and year after entry.
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choose to create a business only after involuntary job separation. Reflecting recent literature on the motivations for business creation, we refer to the former
group as opportunity entrepreneurs and to the latter group as necessity entrepreneurs.
We exploited existing empirical evidence distinguishing the post-entry performance of necessity and opportunity entrepreneurs to calibrate a standard model
of firm growth and survival. Necessity entrepreneurs are more common during
recessions. They also have lower initial earnings, lower growth, and higher exit
rates. We showed that, despite their higher exit rates, enough necessity entrepreneurs survive over long periods of time to create highly persistent effects of even
short-lived recessions.
Our modeling, both of occupational choices and firm performance, is rather stylized. For example, we have assumed that occupational choice depends on the
state of the economy only thoughts its effect on an agent’s employment status.
We do not consider the likelihood that both business earnings and the opportunity cost of remaining in business are lower during recessions.6 As a second example, we have modeled firm performance as then outcome of arithmetic Brownian
motion with drift. It is likely that alternative assumptions, such as the inclusion
of mean reversion or treating growth as the process of learning about ability in
the presence of a stationary process for the stochastic component [cf. Jovanovic
(1982)], may produce quantitatively different results. Nonetheless, the paper raises a plausible mechanism, that seems to have been overlooked, by which transitory economics fluctuations can have long-term consequences on firm performance.
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